

DEMOCRACY IN POST REVOLUTION EGYPT, A STEP FORWARD: AN ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION

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ABSTRACT

Democracy is not an option but a necessity for reform. When people dream of Democracy; they aspire to liberal, participatory and contested democracy. After the 30th of June Revolution, which ended the rule of Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood's president in Egypt, which represents a continuation of autocratic regimes within a biased religious context, a new Road Map was identified for Democracy. This Road Map encompassed steps required for the establishment and consolidation of democracy. However, debates arose about whether Egypt is really moving forward or backward in the way to democracy. This research argues that, although Egypt is not moving swiftly towards democracy due to security and economic pressures; nevertheless, it is on its way to it. This argument is supported by an empirical study which tries to measure and analyze public opinion concerning the views about democratization process in Egypt.

KEYWORDS: *Democracy, Liberal Democracy, Participatory Democracy, Contested Democracy, Measures of Democracy*

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INTRODUCTION

Democracy is the feeling of freedom. People who lived and suffered under autocracy or dictatorship never surrender their dream of liberty. Feeling of freedom is not confined to certain types of liberties; however, it is comprehensive. An Elaborative literature has emerged on democratic transformation and aspirations for democracy in different regions in the world, Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, former Soviet Union republics and the MENA region. This literature has reacted to two key advancements in the regions, first the shrinking of numerous dictator administrations and their substitution by law and democracy based governments. The second improvement is the expanded scholarly enthusiasm for and commitment to popular government. Interested scholars have communicated more enthusiasm for expounding on and supporting popular government than at any other time.¹ Egypt as a country in the MENA region and one of the Arab Spring experiences demonstrates that the wave of democratization in the Arab World was also motivated and triggered by nearly the same motives, the motive to remove authoritarian regimes with their

¹Mainwaring, Scott, (1989), Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues, The Hellen Kelllogg Institute for International studies, Working Paper #130, p 3.

negative political, economic and social impacts and the emergence of a class of enlightened scholars totally devoted and dedicated to democracy and democratic transformation.

Egypt as one of the Arab Spring countries living under repression for decades suffered a lot from the practices and injustices of the authoritarian regimes. The revolution of January 25, 2011 sought to reestablish the relationship between rulers and subjects in Egypt; and in reality, first, it assured that any future Egyptian administration would need to demonstrate its sense of duty wrapped with liberal values keeping in mind the end goal to be viewed as a credible and faithful illustrative of the "way of revolution".² Egyptians, for a very long time, were constrained by a repressive security apparatus which aborted any initiative of democratization. It was the 30 year overbearing regime of Mubarak, which has prompted the feelings of hatred of Egyptian in general and revolutionists in particular. Their grievances spun around the weakening of a wide range of legitimate and political conditions, including police severity, emergency laws, freedom of expression and speech and grand corruption. Moreover the protesters concentrated on economic issues, including high unemployment, the sustenance value swelling, and minimum/ maximum wages.³ Political conditions under Mohamed Morsi, the elected Muslim Brotherhood's president, represented a qualitative shift, from a secular authoritarian and autocratic regime under Mubarak to another authoritarian and autocratic religious regime under Mohamed Morsi. In a broadly illustrative study made in June 2013 by Tahrir Trends, more than 60 percent of more than 1100 individuals said their lives had declined since Morsi's elections.⁴ An assessment survey made in July 2013 by Baseera found that 20 percent of Egyptians felt some empathy for Morsi and his supporters. After a month, more than 66% of Egyptians surveyed by Baseera replied negatively when inquired as to whether they affirmed of the Muslim Brotherhood's preceded with presence.⁵ What clarifies the well-known disappointment with the Brotherhood? The bill of particulars against the Islamists is a long one, yet there are four major checkpoints. First, the Brotherhood crossed paths with Egyptian direct sensibilities by attempting to build up an ideological Islamic state.⁶ The Brotherhood's Islamization project was an aggression on Egypt's identity and was refused resoundingly by Egyptians.⁷ Secondly, the Muslim Brothers proved during their rule that they weren't true believers of democracy and their speeches about it were mere words that masked a fundamental ambition toward domination. Third, the Brotherhood slaughtered democracy by neglecting to contact its adversaries, rather attempting to "Ekhwanize" the state by stuffing the bureaucracy and governmental apparatus with its supporters. Fourth, the most serious and fatal in the list of indictments is Morsi's decree in November 2012 that all of his decisions were to be considered final, binding, and above any kind of judicial review. "An absolute presidential tyranny," Amr Hamzawy, a liberal member of the dissolved Parliament and political scientist, commented online "Egypt is facing a horrifying coup against legitimacy and the rule of law and a complete assassination of the Democracy."⁸

Due to the political failure of Mohamed Morsi in transforming Egypt to democracy, a large number of masses rushed out to the streets on the 30th of June, 2013 demanding to topple the biased rule of the Muslim Brotherhood's

²Winter, Ofir, (July 2015), El-Sisi's First Year as President: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Relations with Israel , Strategic Assessment | Volume 18 | No. 2 , p 10.

³Wahba, Khaled, (2011), Egyptian Revolution 2011: The Fall of the Virtual Wall -The Revolution Systems Thinking Archetype 29th International System Dynamics Conference, Washington, DC, USA.

⁴Masoud, Tarek, (2014), Egyptian Democracy: Smothered in the Cradle, or Stillborn? the Brown Journal of World Affairs, volume xx, issue 2, p 3.

⁵Magued Osman, "Baseera Public Opinion Poll on Egyptians' Sentiments Towards the Muslim Brotherhood," Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research (Baseera), August 27, 2013.

⁶Masoud, Tarek, Ibid, p 7.

⁷WaelNawara, (July 2, 2013), It's the Egyptian Identity, Stupid, Al-Monitor.

⁸<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/world/middleeast/egypts-president-morsi-gives-himself-new-powers.html>

president. About thirty three million Egyptians felt that Egypt is going to face the same fate of the neighboring states, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. Mohamed Morsi and his gang were going to transform Egypt into a battlefield, a battle between Muslims and Christians, a battle between religious and seculars and a battle between Muslims themselves. In addition, he built up the redlines limiting freedom of expression; subjected the media to his messages; took for himself legislative and legal authorities and also, utilized severe measures against his political rivals.⁹ With the success of the 30th of June revolution, a new era started with the election of Abdel Fattah El Sisi to become the sixth president of Egypt in July 2014. Considering the demands of the 25th of January and the 30th of June revolutions, president Al-Sisi announced three commitments regarding building up democracy and to push forward the Democratic process. These responsibilities are: first, commitment to liberal democracy¹⁰ through adopting democratic values such as freedom of expression for individuals, political parties, mass media and civil society organizations, second, commitment to participatory democracy¹¹ through depicting majority rules system based on free elections and transparent election regulations and third, commitment to constitutional or contested democracy¹² demonstrated in the presence of institutions and procedures, prevalence of the rule of law, through which citizens can express preferences about alternative policies and leaders; the presence of regulated limitations on the power of the executive and the assurance of civil liberties to all subjects. Big debates arose about commitments; are there any indicators about the alignment of the administration to these comments? Do Egyptians feel and think that they are moving forward in the democratic process?

Research Problem

This research tries to answer a major question and other relevant questions. The major question, research problem, is: from a popular view is Egypt progressing on the path to democracy with its three different types, liberal, participatory and constitutional or contested? In other words, how do the Egyptians assess and evaluate the democratic transformation after the 30th of June revolution? Moreover, this research tries to answer other relative questions such as: what are the major criteria used to assess Democracy in Egypt? Are there other studies which measured democracy in Egypt and how is this study different from them?

Literature

There is a very wide scope of literature concerning democratization, democracy or democratic transformation. Literature is structured under the organization criterion according to Cooper's taxonomy of literature which includes different criteria, focus, goal, perspective, coverage, organization, and audience.¹³ Under the organization criterion, there are many formats in which to organize a review; three of the most common are the historical format, the conceptual format, and the methodological format.¹⁴ The researcher adopts the conceptual format which is built around concepts. Part of this

⁹Sham, N. i., (December 9, 2012) Egypt under Muslim Brotherhood Rule: The Constitutional Declaration – Dictatorship in the Name of the Revolution, www.memri.org.

¹⁰Gastil index of civil liberties and political rights produced annually by Freedom House, [www.https://freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

¹¹Vanhanen, Tatu (2000), 'A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998., Journal of Peace Research 37(2): 251-265.

¹²Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers. 2003. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003. <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity>

¹³ Cooper, H. M. (1988). Organizing knowledge synthesis: A taxonomy of literature reviews, Knowledge in Society, 1,104-126.

¹⁴ ibid.

literature discusses the major theoretical approaches of transition theories with a critical review of these approaches. Sujian Guo argued that although there are different theoretical approaches to transition, these approaches have not provided any coherent and comprehensive body of work.¹⁵ Guo identified four approaches for the transition: first, structuralist approach,¹⁶ Second, the strategic choice approach.¹⁷ The third approach is institutional.¹⁸ Fourth, the political economy approach.¹⁹ Leonardo Morlino,²⁰ used an explanatory concept, installation of democracy, which involves recognition and consolidation of civil rights, multiparty based system and effective civil society organizations, democratic procedures and institutions. Pridham, also, sought a similar perspective by proposing a suitable context for delineating southern and Eastern European transitions.²¹ Similarly, Schmitter analyzed the transition by considering the current and past situations, the expected outcomes, the accessible agents for transition and the modes of transition and the government and international factors.²²

Despite their similarities and differences, the above mentioned studies furnished this research with the base background of the theoretical framework of what democracy means, for example, styles of democracy, structuralist, strategic choice, institutional and political, economic transitions and types of democracies, liberal, constitutional and participatory that could be accessible in post-revolution Egypt. To clarify this some questions might be posed: what does democracy mean for Egyptians? Of course, the environmental framework differs from one country to another, so it is very important to recognize how Egyptians conceive democracy. Another question is what kind of democracy is accessible by Egyptians, structuralist, strategic choice, institutional or political-economic transition? Moreover, what kind of democracy is sought by Egyptians, liberal, constitutional or participatory?

Another part of the literature talked about cases of democracy in different countries. Some of these studies tried to show examples of success stories in transforming to democracy, highlighting some of the major factors which motivated the transition process such as culture, history, economic structure, the role of outsiders and pursued sequencing of political and economic reform. A study made by Tom Ginsburg reviewed some major factors that underpinned democratization in some consolidated democracy since the mid-1980, Taiwan, Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Mongolia.²³ Other studies talked about the failure of democratization in some countries. An example of these studies is a study made by Merhan Kamrava about the failing experience of democracy in the Middle East. Kamrava argued that the key to understanding democratization lies rather in the nature of state-society relations instead of the way of society's standards and values themselves. Bernard Lewis claimed that the overwhelming and extensive role of religion and the inability of the Middle East to dethrone religion as the organizing principle of society undermined the prospects for democracy. Kamrava claimed it is not on the grounds that the region is overwhelmingly Islamic or is beset by purportedly undemocratic culture, culture is not an obstacle to democracy as it is liable to impacts from the larger polity, particularly seeing that the economy

¹⁵ Guo, Sujian, (1999), *Democracy: A Critical View*, Issues & Studies 35, no.4, p 133-4.

¹⁶ Przeworski, Adam, (1991), *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Europe and Latin America*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 95-99.

¹⁷ Stephan Alfred, linz, Juan, ed., (1978), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, John Hopkins Press.

¹⁸ O'Neil, Patrick, H. (1996), *Revolution From Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions From Authoritarianism, and The Case of Hungary*, World Politics, 48, pp 579-603.

¹⁹ Kaufman, Robert R, Haggard, Stephan, (1997), *The Political Economy of Democracy*, Comparative Politics, 29, pp. 263-84.

²⁰ Morlino, Leonardo, (2014), *Transitions to Democracy, What Theory to Grasp Complexities*, Luis University Press, p 1.

²¹ Pridham, G, (2000), *The Dynamics of Democratization, A Comparative Approach*, (London Continuum).

²² Schmitter, P.c, (2013), *Reflections on Transitology, Before and After*, European University Institute, Florence.

²³ Ginsburg, Tom, (2008), *Lessons for Democracy : Case Studies from Asia*, Journal of World Affairs, pp. 1-3.

and the activities of the state are concerned.²⁴ Egypt is a part of the Middle East and the Arab World and so what applies to the Middle East and Arab world countries applies to Egypt as well. Some studies focused on the impediments of democratization process in Egypt, Tarek Masoud, argued that from the beginning with the removal of Hosni Mubark regime in 2011, democratization in Egypt was hindered due to different reasons, the SCAF (Supreme council of Armed Forces), which viewed itself as a neutral supervisor for peaceful rotation of authority, the endeavor of the Muslim Brotherhood to brotherhoodize the state by stuffing bureaucracy with their members, supporters and allies and to establish the Islamic State in Egypt, the disorganized and divided secular or liberal opposition and its reluctance to play the democratic game, the insufficient social infrastructure significantly required to sustain democracy, incapability of the political landscape and the underdeveloped institutions.²⁵ Ofir Winter, in his work, argued that president El-Sisi made some democratic promises, commitment to democratic values, portraying democracy as a goal and his support for democracy; nevertheless, security instability and economic harsh conditions put him in a sort of dilemma, commitment to democracy or security and safe economic prosperity.²⁶

A third part of the literature focused on the way to measure democracy or in other words, what method could be used to assess the democratic process? Broadly speaking, these approaches are divided into two major approaches, minimalists, and maximalists. The minimalists, the thinner approach, depending on a limited number of key variables which would develop vivid and unambiguous empirical findings. For example, Tatu Vanhanen built up a scaled measure of the democratic system in every nation as indicated by two criteria: the level of electoral competition and the level of electoral participation which he consolidates to yield an index of democratization.²⁷ By contrast Maximalists or thicker perspectives, consider democracies to be a multivariable based system. Although democracies are characterized by two main attributes, contestation and participation, democratic regime is characterized by the existence of many democratic indicators, Dahl argued.²⁸ These institutions include but not confined to elected officials, free and fair elections, freedom of expression, accessible information, free participation, and associational autonomy.²⁹ Moreover, some maximalists have employed alternative and different indicators of participation and contestation from those employed by Dahl, for example, Freedom House's³⁰ and Polity IV's classification of democracy.³¹ In addition, even if some maximalists use the same indicators; they give these indicators different weight.³² Another measurement method, Staffan Lindberg, used objective alongside subjective indicators to establish a hybrid measure of democracy.³³ Last and not least, notwithstanding these measures of democracy, another assessment methodology abstains from making outside judgments against pre-set up criteria or utilizing the sort of objective measures delineated above and depends rather on an open view of democracy

²⁴Kamrava, Merhan, (2007), *The Middle East's Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective*, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, p 189. (189-213)

²⁵Masoud, Tarek, (2014), *Egyptian Democracy: Smothered in The Cradle or Stillborn?*, *The Brown Journal of world affairs*, Volume 20, Issue 2, pp3-13.

²⁶ Winter, Ofir, (2015), *El-Sisi's First Year as President: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Relations with Israel*, *Strategic Assessment*, Volume 18, No. 2

²⁷ Vanhanen, Tatu, *ibid*.

²⁸Dahl., Robert A, (2005) *What political institutions does large-scale democracy require?* *Political Science Quarterly*, 120(2): pp. 187-197.

²⁹ Dahl, Robert, (1989), *Democracy and its Critics*, New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 221

³⁰Freedom House. 2007. *Freedom in the World, 2007*. 'Methodology'. www.freedomhouse.org.

³¹ Polity IV Project: *Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002*. Dataset Users' Manual. Maryland: University of Maryland. www.cidm.umd.edu/inscr/polity

³²Joe Foweraker and Roman Krznaric. 2003. 'Differentiating the democratic performance of the West.' *European Journal of Political Research* 42(3): 313-341.

³³Lindberg, S. (2006) *Democracy and Elections in Africa*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

through the gathering of individual-level survey data. Such information, give a sign of how much the mass generally bolsters democracy, and also give indicators on mass impression of the relative execution of democracy and confidence in democratic based organizations. As opposed to other assessment methodologies to democracy, this information gives a sign of public support for democracy, which shows the noteworthy variety between and inside areas.³⁴

This study employs the last assessment methodology, an open view of democracy through the gathering of individual-level survey data. In the following part, the researcher will identify why surveys are used.

RESEARCH METHODS

The research adopts the quantitative method which assists to classify features, count them and construct the statistical models in an attempts to explain what is observed. The study used two instruments: questionnaires and desk research. The questionnaires were addressed to different categories of respondents (600) from different governorates (Alexandria, Cairo, Mansoura, Port Said, Sharqyya and 6th of October City). The general objective of the questionnaire was to get primary data and collect more information on how Egyptians evaluate the democracy experience in the post the 30th of June 2013 revolution. Secondary data will be acquired through a desk research which depends vigorously on the utilization of accessible data and information from different resources. Data analysis is performed in stages; the first step is preparatory, through which a descriptive analysis is done for each dimension under study to obtain mean, variance, and standard deviation for each dimension. Then, the relationship between dimensions will be tested by obtaining the correlation matrix. The researcher uses the Pearson correlation coefficient (Pearson r); Pearson r determines the strength of the linear relationship between two variables, an independent variable, and the dependent variable. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, the researcher will use the statistical package “Statistical Program in the Social Science”, or SPSS to apply the above-mentioned analysis. SPSS is considered as the most widely used and comprehensive, as well as the most popular package in statistics. The researcher is supposed to use descriptive analysis, correlations, as well as fitting models.

Research Hypotheses

This research discusses a number of hypotheses which shed light on the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The independent variables are freedom of expression, political participation, freedom, and transparency of elections, protection of human right and existence of the rule of law. The dependent variable is the democracy. These hypotheses are stated as follows:

- Increasing freedom of expression leads to increasing the scope of democracy in Egypt.
- Increasing political participation leads to increasing the scope of democracy in Egypt.
- Increasing freedom and transparency of elections lead to increasing the scope of democracy in Egypt.
- Increasing the scope of human right protection leads to increasing the scope of democracy in Egypt.
- Increasing the scope of the rule of law leads to increasing the scope of democracy in Egypt.

³⁴Landman, Todd, (2007), Developing Democracy: Concepts, Measures, and Empirical RelationshipsCentre for Democratic GovernanceDepartment of Government University of Essex, Background paper prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, pp. 7-8.

Research Model




Figure 1

Research Type

This research is an applied research. It contributes to portray a realistic image about how Egyptian evaluates the democratic experience in Egypt depending on analyzing Egyptian opinions about the democratic measures in Egypt, concerning freedom of expression, political participation, freedom and transparency of elections, protection of human right and existence of the rule of law. Although Egypt is included in a lot of international democracy indexes, this research represents a type of national self-assessment of the democrati process in Egypt.

Findings and Analysis

As mentioned before self-assessment is essential as it enables every nation to set its perception of democracy and its requirements and will lead an evaluation compatible with its lawful, political, social, economic and institutional conditions. Although there are different meanings and applications of democracy; however, there are certain general pillars upon which democracy stands: freedom of expression, political participation, free elections, and protection of human rights and implementation of the rule of law. To measure the levels of these pillars is an indispensable indicator of how democracy proceeds in a certain country; this self-assessment is essential as it enables transitioning countries to implement a reform action plan and identify areas requiring democratic reform to start with, for example, enacting new laws for elections and related issues, channels of political participation and protection of rule of law, etc. Egypt, as one of the Arab Spring Countries, requires to a large extent periodic self-assessment of democracy. Egypt, an authoritarian state for a very long time, is more prone to non-democracy than to democracy. Sequent governments never paid any attention to democracy. Grand corruption made democracy an inaccessible dream. Egyptians who never smelt the breeze of democracy will find difficulty to behave democratically and unwise democracy will lead to a sort of breakout. Therefore, time to time democracy assessment is urgently required to assure the democratic behavior of both Egyptians and the government.

Since the 25th of January and the 30th of June Revolutions in Egypt, democracy became a necessity not an option for reform. After the two revolutions, Egypt became a spot of interest for international democracy indexes. This is due to the fact Egypt is a pivotal country with a strategic weight in the Middle East and represents the model for Arab and African countries that view Egypt as an exemplary state. Due to its strategic position and weight, countries which have a strategic interest in the Middle East watch closely what occurs in Egypt and try to analyze every single measure adopted in Egypt. Therefore a lot of international democracy indexes, monitor and track the level of democracy in Egypt over time. Examples of these indexes include the Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, Polity IV, and Transformation Index.

These indexes, view Egypt is lagging behind on the way to democracy. However, there are some reservations on these indexes. First, there is no consensus on a common and comprehensive definition of democracy in these indexes; therefore, to measure it is not an easy task. Second, these indexes use the “one fits all” approach as they employ general indicators for all countries included in these indexes without considering the differences between countries in terms of history, culture, political regime and ideology. These generalizations lead to stereotypes that may be correct or incorrect. Moreover, these indexes use scales of categories to identify the degree of each category in each of the countries under focus; these scales are, mainly, based on very broad and subjective criteria, for example, pluralism, political culture, level of socioeconomic development, organization of the market and competition which seem difficult to be measured and to give accurate information out of these measurements and categories. Besides, sources of data for example, household and experts ‘surveys, ready made subjective indicators don’t give an accurate evaluation of the success or failure of the democracy in the countries concerned. Finally, these indexes focus on measuring whether democracy exists or not and not the quality of the existing democracy.

Due to the above-mentioned drawbacks of the international democracy assessment indexes, national initiatives were made to assess democracy process in Egypt. A number of local institutions are giving information about the democratization process in Egypt, for example: Public Opinion Poll provided by Information and Decision Support Center - IDSC, Baseera, The Egyptian Association for Community Participation Enhancement, and The International Development Center. Moreover, initiatives were made, for example, by The Social Contract Center to construct an Egyptian democracy index that includes guiding indicators to assess and sustain democracy in Egypt. These indicators include: democratizing the process, establish a general framework of democracy index, identify areas and levels of assessments, defining the elements of democracy in accordance to Egypt’s priorities, determination of data collection resources and dissemination of results transparently.³⁵The researcher here, inclined to construct a national assessment of democracy index, focuses on Egypt’s transition post the 30th of June 2013 revolution employing a number of indicators through which public opinion is measured concerning evaluating democracy in Egypt during this period. The researcher considers five indicators and poses questions, through distributed questionnaires, to respondents concerning the evaluation of these indicators. These indicators are: freedom of expression, political participation, free and transparent elections, protection of human rights and the rule of law. In the following sections analysis of these indicators will be provided.

Freedom of Expression

Correlation

There is a correlation of (.479) between freedom of expression and Democracy. A correlation of (.479) is a strong positive correlation and it is significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, we can say that a strong positive correlation was found (.479, $p < 0.01$) indicating a significant linear relationship between the two variables.

As previously mentioned, this research measures and assess democracy in Egypt in the post 30th of June revolution period. Considered variables start with freedom of expression. Democracy starts with expressing one’s demands, views and opinions concerning one’s political life. No doubt that freedom of expression stands as a major pillar of democracy. A large number of the previously mentioned international indexes of democracy identify freedom of expression as an important indicator of democracy. A number of international reports, Rule of law Watch (2016), for

³⁵ El Gammal, Mai, (2014), Towards Constructing An Egyptian Democracy Index: A Glance on The International Indexes, The Social Contract Center, pp. 8-9.

example directed a lot of accusations to Egypt claiming that authorities have detained several thousands, adequately restricted dissents, and banned the nation's biggest resistance gathering, the Muslim Brotherhood. Courts have sentenced hundreds to death, including Morsy, after unjustifiable trials, restrict freedom of expression and association by investigating independent civil society organizations and issued a counterterrorism law widened prosecutors power to detain suspects without judicial review and to order wide-ranging and potentially indefinite surveillance of terrorist suspects without court orders.³⁶ To detect the lie or truthfulness of this allegations, here, the researcher tries to investigate how Egyptian view freedom to express their opinions concerning political issues; in other words what is the scope of liberty in expressing one's own views and opinions concerning politics? Is freedom constrained? A number of questions are posed to respondents to know their opinions about their ability to express freely their opinions and views. These questions are: Can individuals express their opinions freely in political affairs? Can political parties and CSOs express their opinions freely in political affairs? Can Youth, Woman and Minorities express their opinions freely in political affairs? Can Mass Media express their opinions freely in political affairs and criticize government policies? Are there sufficient and accessible means for free expression for the people? These questions ask about the scope, freedom of expression of individuals, political parties, civil society organizations, youth, women, minorities and mass media. Before identifying the responses, it is worth mentioning that in Egypt Constitution (2014), it is stated in Art. (65) That freedom of thought and opinion is guaranteed. Every person has a right to express his/her opinion verbally, in writing, through imagery, or by any other means of expression and publication.³⁷ Moreover, articles (70-77) guarantee freedom of the press, mass media, the establishment of political parties, civil society organizations, syndicates and federations and the law shall guarantee their independence. The percentages show that (24.56%) think that the scope of freedom is very good, (19.38%) thinks it is good and (34.42%) think it is medium with a total percentage of (78.36%), while (16.66%) think it is poor and (4.98%) think it is very poor with a total percentage of (21.64%). This shows that about (43.94%) of the respondents have a positive opinion about freedom of expression. One of the respondents said that "We can express our opinions freely and wondered if freedom is to attack the state without any supporting logic. Another respondent said that "Egypt is in the travail stage recently overthrew two autocratic regimes, Mubarak and Morsi, so freedom must be legalized so as to prevent chaos." From what is stated in Egypt Constitution and the opinions of the respondents, it is apparent that freedom of expression is, somehow, guaranteed for all categories. There might be some legal restrictions on the scope of freedom; however, this could be justified by the facts that Egypt is a state in transition and it faces a harsh war with terrorist groups which threaten the security of the state.

Political Participation

Correlation

There is a correlation of (.473) between political participation and Democracy. A correlation of (.473) is a strong positive correlation and it is significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, we can say that a strong positive correlation was found (.473, $p < 0.01$) indicating a significant linear relationship between the two variables.

The second important indicator of democracy is political participation. Political participation simply means active involvement in political processes and affairs. Participation enables individuals and political structures to play a role in

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, World Report, (2016) www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/egypt

³⁷ Egypt Constitution (2014), Article (65).

decision making process.³⁸ This involvement requires various mechanisms to facilitate participation, for example, accessible means of participation, disciplined procedures, sessions for discussions, consideration of fruitful suggestions and implementation mechanisms. For investigating the opinions of respondents about political participation, some questions are posed concerning political participation mechanisms. The first question asks about the availability and accessibility of means of participation; in other words, is it politically accessible for Egyptian to engage in the political decision making processes? The above table shows that (22%) very good and (25%) good and (32.7%) medium, of the respondents think that there are sufficient and accessible means of political participation, for example, elections, referenda, political parties, associations and syndicates, etc. Moreover, there are no governmental restrictions on these means. On the other side, (15.3%) poor and (5%)very poor think that there are neither sufficient nor accessible means of political participation. Comparing the percentages of the two sides, we will find that about (47%)have positive opinion about the sufficiency and accessibility of the means of participation; while (20.3%) have negative. For the second question which asks about the available procedures for suggestions to reach the concerned governmental authorities, (5.3%) very good and (7%) good with a totality of (12.3%), think that there are procedures and channels through which suggestions and opinions can reach the concerned governmental authorities, for example, public offices of the concerned ministries, members in the House of Representatives, e-mails of high officials and domestic administration councils, etc. On the other side, (35.46) poor and (19.02%) very poor with a totality of (54.48%), say that there are neither sufficient nor efficient procedures through which their suggestions could be transferred and that situation didn't differ from Mubarak's time. If the aforementioned means of participation exist, the procedures through which their opinions and suggestions could be heard aren't sufficient and clearly identified. For the third question which investigates about holding public sessions by governmental authorities to discuss public issues and related suggestions and opinions, we find that (4%) very good and (9.5%) good with a totality of (13.5%)and (5%) medium; while on the other hand, we find that (38.7%) poor and (48.2%) very poor with a totality of (86.9%) say that public sessions are rarely held and in case they are held, this occurs only before election time to attract voters only. The case isn't different with the fourth question concerning the implementation of good suggestions as (42.7%) poor and (39.3%) very poor with a totality of (82%), say that there are neither sufficient nor efficient procedures for effective and transparent implementation; while (1.4%) very good and (5.8%) good with a totality of (7.2%) and (10.8%) medium. Moreover, responses to the fifth question didn't differ from the fourth question as (45.2%) poor and (39.5%) very poor with a totality of (84.7%), say that there are neither sufficient nor efficient mechanisms for implementation; while (1.3%) very good and (7.8%) good with a totality of (9.1%) and (6.2%) medium.

From the above mentioned information, one can deduce that although various participation mechanisms are available, consideration and implementation of suggestions still suffer from drawbacks. However, the researcher thinks that the claim that during Mubarak's rule participation mechanisms were available too, and hence there is no difference between present and past is a false claim. Under the Mubarak's rule, formal political participation was to a great extent confined to regime partner party action, co-picked civil society organizations, or voting in nontransparent and regularly fake races. Casual political support, through informal organizations, underground political associations and social movements, was frequently the main route for subjects to challenge their regimes.³⁹ Current participation mechanisms are void of regime's, to some extent, control; diverse mass media programs, talk shows, talk about current political issues,

³⁸Sharaf, Radwa (2014). Graffiti As a Means of Protest And Documentation in The Egyptian Revolution. African Conflict and Peace building Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring pp. 152-161.

³⁹Jamal, Amaney, (2011), Actors, Public Opinion, and Participation, The Middle East 193, pp. 231–37.

invite audiences to participate and express their opinions freely, identify the drawbacks of the government and criticize official wrong doers without any kind of constraints.

Free Elections

Correlation

There is a correlation of (.536) between Free Elections and democracy. A correlation of (.536) is a strong positive correlation and it is significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, we can say that a strong positive correlation was found (.536, $p < 0.01$) indicating a significant linear relationship between the two variables.

The third important indicator of democracy is the existence of free elections. Most of the international indexes of democracy, consider and depend on free elections as a decisive element of democracy. In this context, some questions are posed to investigate the opinions of the respondents about the existence of free elections in Egypt. These questions include issues like the law of elections, voting, management and supervision of elections, counting operations and results dissemination.

Concerning the first question which asks about the adoption of a satisfactory and transparent law concerning rules and division of electorates, we find that (6%) very good, (10%) good with a totality of (16%), while we find that (30%) poor and (25%) very poor with a totality of (55%) and (29%) medium. This shows that about (55%) of the respondents think that the adopted law for election isn't satisfactory and transparent in rules and division of electoral constituencies. Some of them said that the post-revolution modifications reduce prospects for Egyptian women and Coptics to be chosen to office, and hence reducing their scope in the public sphere. Second, the constrained post-transformation changes made to election laws are lacking to deliver democracy looked for by Egyptians. Others said that the present electoral system weakens the development of political parties by continuous dependence on traditional alliances and well off people. The electoral system has alienated some political parties, at least in their public discourse, for what is perceived to be the backing of a system. On the other hand, supporters of the law, nonetheless, contend that voters like to choose known applicants, and are more acquainted with an emphasis on singular hopefuls, which removes the appointive framework used under ex-president Hosni Mubarak.

Concerning easiness in the voting process, the researcher found that (50%) very good, (20 %) good with a totality of (70%), while we find that (4%) poor and (6%) very poor with a totality of (10%) and (20%) medium. This indicates that the majority of voters hardly find difficulties in their voting. Proponents said that they easily got their electoral number and know their electoral constituencies through the internet and this facilitates to a large extent the voting process for them. When they went to the electoral committees, they found no difficulties in dealing with the in charge officials who were guiding voters inside these committees. With regard to elections, managing and supervising, we find that (25%) very good, (26%) good with a totality of (41%), while we find that (15%) poor and (5%) very poor with a totality of (20%) and (29%) medium. This shows that proponents view the managing and supervising as an effective and transparent because managing and supervising are run according to legal procedures and implemented by the judiciary which guarantees transparency of the electoral process. Regarding the existence of transparent and correct counting mechanisms, the researcher found that (45%) very good, (30%) good with a totality of (75%), while we find that (8%) poor and (2%) very poor with a totality of (10%) and (15%) medium. Regarding the publication of results, the researcher found that (50%) very good, (35%) good with a totality of (85%), while we find that (4%) poor and (1%) very poor with a totality of (5%) and (10%) medium.

Human Rights

Correlation

There is a correlation of (.617) between Protection of Human Rights and democracy. A correlation of (.617) is a strong positive correlation and it is significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, we can say that a strong positive correlation was found (.617, $p < 0.01$) indicating a significant linear relationship between the two variables.

The yearning to ensure the human dignity of every individual is at the center of the human rights idea. It puts the human individual in the focal point of concern. It depends on a typical widespread esteem framework dedicated to the holiness of life and gives a structure for building a human rights framework secured by universally acknowledged standards and principles.⁴⁰ The file of human rights in Egypt hasn't been prosperous and encouraging. For decades, Egyptians witnessed regime intolerable measures concerning freedom and dignity. When the Egyptians revolted against Mubarak's authoritarian regime, on the 25th of January 2011, they were dreaming of breathing the breeze of liberty; however, they were let down by the rule of the Muslim Brothers who tried to kidnap the Egyptian state and enforce their ideology. With the advent of the 30th of June Revolution and the stepping down of the Muslim Brotherhood rule, the dream of liberty was revived again. Free discussions about establishing various mechanisms to ensure human rights implementations were made; modification of the constitution human rights related articles and provisions were made and activation of the role of the National Council of Human rights took place. The following table includes questions to measure the enforcement of the human rights in Egypt.

The first question asks the respondents about the fair and transparent application of human rights according to Egypt's constitution. The researcher found that (30%) very good, (35 %) good with a totality of (65%), while we find that (15%) poor and (10%) very poor with a totality of (25%) and (30%) medium. The second question asks about minorities' enjoyment of all rights entitled to them by the constitution and international human rights charters. The researcher found that (30%) very good, (35%) good with a totality of (65%), while we find that (15%) poor and (5%) very poor with a totality of (20%) and (15%) medium. Concerning programs to increase awareness about individuals' rights and obligations in the third question, the researcher found that (15%) very good, (15%) good with a totality of (30%), while we find that (25%) poor and (15%) very poor with a totality of (40%) and (30%) medium. The fourth question asks about the National Human Rights Council and its effectiveness in performing its functions to protect human rights in a satisfactory and effective manner. The researcher found that (10%) very good, (15%) good with a totality of (25%), while (30%) poor and (25%) very poor with a totality of (55%) and (20%) medium. The last question asks about how speedy and effective are measures of remedies in dealing with human rights violations. The researcher found that (5%) very good, (10%) good with a totality of (15%), while (35%) poor and (25%) very poor with a totality of (60%) and (25%) medium.

From the above mentioned results, we can say that the file of human rights in Egypt has its pros and cons. The pros are demonstrated in the first and second questions where positive results are attained concerning the enjoyment of Egyptians and a minority of their human rights. However, the cons are demonstrated in the results of the other three questions concerning awareness programs, the effectiveness of the National Council for Human rights and the speed and effectiveness of remedy measures.

⁴⁰Benedek, Wolfgang, ed., (2012), Understanding Human Rights, European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC), p 28.

The issue of human rights is debatable even in the well-known democracies in the world. Many examples in the USA demonstrate that it isn't the model democracy it fancies itself. Watching Israel's merciless treatment of Palestinians in Gaza over US TV screens makes it simple to disregard the human rights mishandle occurring appropriate on American soil and a big number of black Americans were shot by the police force during 2016.⁴¹ Moreover, in France the state of emergency was extended four times during the year 2016, on 24 October the authorities started the expulsion of more than 6,500 migrants and shelter searchers living in the casual settlement known as "The Jungle" in Calais, a procedure that took a few days. Demonstrations occurred amongst March and September to challenge the legislature upheld proposition to change the Labor Code, which was received in July. The authorities were explicitly allowed to forbidden public protests by claiming that they were not able to guarantee public order. Many demonstrations were prohibited and several people were subjected to regulatory measures, limiting their freedom of protesting.⁴² In Turkey, 2016/2017, an attempted coup prompted a massive government crackdown on civil servants and civil society. Those accused of connections to the Fethullah Gülen development were the principle target. More than 40,000 individuals were remanded in pre-trial confinement amid a half year of emergency. There was proof of the torment of prisoners in the wake of the upset endeavor. Almost 90,000 government workers were expelled; several media outlets and NGOs were shut down and columnists, activists and MPs were detained. Infringement of human rights by security powers proceeded with exemption, particularly in the dominantly Kurdish southeast of the nation, where urban populaces were held under 24-hour curfew. Up to a large portion of a million people were uprooted in the nation.⁴³

If this is the case with well-known democracy, logically, it would be accepted in transitional states that violations of human rights occur too. Of course a lot of biased indexes focus on the file of human rights in Egypt and they make Egypt accountable for human rights violation discarding the fact that Egypt is transforming from an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. In addition, Egypt is confronting very harsh wars, Economic catastrophe and terrorism, which force Egypt to act cautiously concerning human rights.

Rule of Law

Correlation

There is a correlation of (.595) between the Rule of Law and Democracy. A correlation of (.595) is a strong positive correlation and it is significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, we can say that a strong positive correlation was found (.595, $p < 0.01$) indicating a significant linear relationship between the two variables.

The UN Secretary-General has depicted the rule of law as "a rule of governance in which all people, organizations and elements, open and private, including the state itself, are responsible to laws that are freely proclaimed, similarly implemented and autonomously mediated, and which are reliable with the global rule of law standards and measures. It requires, also, measures to guarantee adherence to the standards of supremacy of law, equality before the law, responsibility to the law, decency in the use of the law, separation of powers, cooperation in basic leadership, legitimate sureness, shirking of intervention and procedural and legal transparency."⁴⁴ According to the World Justice Project (WJP), the rule of law is defined in terms of its outcomes that rule of law create and foster in societies. Examples of these are

⁴¹ Chronology of Human Rights Violations of the United States in 2016, http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/03/09/content_281475589814212.htm

⁴² <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/france/report-france/>

⁴³ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/>

⁴⁴ <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/>

accountability, respect for the rule of law and access to justice, each of which is reflective about one aspect of the sophisticated perception of the rule of law.⁴⁵

The WJP defined rule of law in terms of its outcomes that create and foster in societies. The WJP typifies these outcomes inside a straightforward and sound structure to gauge the degree which nations accomplish in these outcomes by a group of systemized performance indicators. The WJP utilizes a working meaning of the rule of law in light of four widespread standards, got from globally acknowledged benchmarks. These standards are accountability to laws by all governmental officials and agents and all individuals in the country, laws are explicit, publicized, and stable and evenly protect fundamental rights, the process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient, finally, justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives.⁴⁶ The rule of law is a framework in which the accompanying four all-inclusive standards are maintained. These standards are formulated in question form for the respondents to answer.

A number of questions, try to investigate the opinions of the respondents about the existence and effective application of the rule of law concept in post-revolution Egypt. The first question asks the about the fair and transparent application of the rule of law on all individuals and government officials equally according to Egypt's constitution. The researcher found that (10%) very good, (15 %) good with a totality of (25%), while we find that (25%) poor and (30%) very poor with a totality of (55%) and (30%) medium. The second question asks about clarity, publication, stability and justice of the laws. The researcher found that (8%) very good, (12%) good with a totality of (20%), while we find that (25%) poor and (30%) very poor with a totality of (55%) and (30%) medium. Concerning accessible, fair, and efficient enactment, administration and enforcement processes of law in the third question, The researcher found that (10%) very good, (10%) good with a totality of (20%), while we find that (30%) poor and (25%) very poor with a totality of (55%) and (25%) medium. The fourth question asks about existence of competent, ethical, and independent agencies and their efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of justice. The researcher found that (15%) very good, (25%) good with a totality of (40%), while (22%) poor and (8%) very poor with a totality of (30%) and (30%) medium. The last question asks about mechanisms to regularly review the laws by the concerned agencies to ensure that laws are compatible with the requirements of the times and the needs of the various sects of society. The researcher found that (20%) very good, (25%) good with a totality of (45%), while (20%) poor and (10%) very poor with a totality of (30%) and (25%) medium.

Absence of the rule of law was a focal purpose behind the Egyptian revolution in 2011, and the revolution gives a brilliant chance to set up full lead of law in Egypt. The period following the revolution saw an expanding pattern regarding the rule of law, through changes, for example, authorization of legal choices, attempting the previous president and his escort previously official courtrooms, and expanded advancement of opportunity of articulation. Be that as it may, a few genuine obstructions to the advancing rule of law remain. This is apparent regarding the respondents' answers about the rule of law questions as these answers seemed more pro the negative (45%) than the positive side (30%). To explain this many approaches tried to give their interpretations. For example, the traditional approach to political economic development and law considers developing countries, Egypt as one of them, as incomplete versions of developed ones as they lack the basic elements of mature developed societies. North, Wallis, and Weingast, the NWW (2008), approach gives

⁴⁵World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2016,
<https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016>

p 11.

⁴⁶ ibid.

another clarification on why it is so hard to transplant these foundations from formed developed to developing countries. This framework divides today's societies into two different types of social orders, arguing that developing countries differ dramatically in their social organization from those of developed ones as the former impose restrictions on rivalry, and access to associations upset long haul monetary advancement of these social orders. Conversely, open access orders utilize rivalry and open access to associations to control brutality and are portrayed by lease disintegration and long haul monetary development.⁴⁷

Democracy

It is self-evident that democracy is based on various pillars, freedom of expression, political participation, free and transparent elections, protection of human rights and the rule of law. The researcher tried to investigate the opinions of the respondents about the progress of democracy in Egypt through some questions that are identified with the following table.

The first question asks about the role of the state, its apparatus and governmental institutions, in contributing to the democratization process in Egypt. The researcher found that (28%) very good, (26 %) good with a totality of (54%), while (14%) poor and (3%) very poor with a totality of (17%) and (29%) medium. The second question asks about the existence of a system of checks and balance among the state authorities, the legislative, executive and judicial to create a democratic atmosphere to assume their responsibilities towards the citizens fairly and transparently. The researcher found that (25%) very good, (20%) good with a totality of (45%), while we find that (25%) poor and (20%) very poor with a totality of (58.5%) and (10%) medium. Concerning the political culture and prevailing political awareness and whether they help to achieve democracy, the researcher found that (20%) very good, (25%) good with a totality of (45%), while (25%) poor and (15%) very poor with a totality of (40%) and (15%) medium. Concerning the fourth question which asks about the participation of non-governmental organizations, for example, civil society organizations and parties, in democratization, the researcher found that (25%) very good, (30%) good with a totality of (55%), while (15%) poor and (10%) very poor with a totality of (25%) and (20%) medium. The last question asks about the contribution of the legislative authority in the country to the consolidation of democracy through legislations and laws. The researcher found that (30%) very good, (30%) good with a totality of (60%), while (20%) poor and (10%) very poor with a totality of (30%) and (10%) medium. To sum this up, concerning questions about the independent variable, democracy, the positive side is (51.8%) and the negative side is (31.4%) and medium (16.8%). This indicates that although, Egypt has not yet reached full democracy; however, it is on the way. Although there are some drawbacks, the relatively high percentage of the respondents who think that Egypt is moving towards democracy indicates that the future of democracy in Egypt is promising.

From the above mentioned results we can deduce that the pillars of democracy which are fairly good in accordance to the respondents are as follows, first, freedom of expression was found that about (44%) of the respondent to think that freedom of expression is good and improving; while about (22%) think that it is restricted. This shows that Egypt is stepping forward in the freedom of expression variable. Second, regarding political participation, the researcher found that (18%) were positive and (70.28%) were negative. Third, regarding the third pillar, free and transparent elections, the researcher found that (59.4%) were positive while (20%) were negative. Fourth, concerning protection of human rights, the researcher found (30%) were positive and (45%) were negative. Fifth, regarding the rule of law, the researcher found that (55%) were positive and (45%) were negative. The aforementioned percentages indicate how the

⁴⁷Weingast, Barry R., (2008), Why Developing Countries Prove So Resistant to the Rule of Law, http://jenni.uchicago.edu/WJP/Vienna_2008/Weingast_ROL_MS_2%2000_08-0519.pdf, pp. 1-2.

respondents view the democracy process in Egypt. This is apparent in the total percentages concerning positive views and negative view. Concerning the percentages, the researcher found that (51.8 %) were positive and (31.4%) were negative.

The following table shows the percentages of positive and negative views concerning all variables:

Table 1

Variables	% Positive	% Negative
Freedom of expression	44	22
Political participation	18	70.28
Free and transparent elections	59.4	20
Protection of human rights	30	45
Rule of law	55	45
Democracy	51.8	31.4

Consequently, when we test the previously mentioned hypotheses, we will find that all of these hypotheses proved to be correct as when freedom of expression, political participation, free and transparent elections, and protection of human rights and the rule of law are enhanced, this will lead to the enhancement of democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

Democracy is the dream of peoples around the globe. Democratic countries are keen to increase the scope of democracy. Nondemocratic or authoritarian countries try to transform into democracy. Of course, the road to democracy is not paved with flowers; a lot of challenges confront dreaming countries, especially countries transforming from non-democracy to democracy. Egypt as one of these countries started to experience a democratic stage. We can't claim that Egypt has achieved full democracy; however, we can say that Egypt is on the right way towards democracy. This is not a subjective evaluation, but an objective evaluation based on the findings of the analyzed distributed questionnaires. Regarding the findings and analysis, the researcher found that the respondents are fairly satisfied with some of the pillars of democracy, freedom of expression, free and transparent elections and rule of law and are not satisfied with some pillars, political participation and protection of human rights which require some improvements.

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